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This paper experimentally explores group decision-making in a two-
player power-to-take game. Discussions preceding group decisions are 
videotaped and analyzed. Each subject first earns an income in an 
individual effort task preceding the game. The game consists of two 
stages. First, one group can claim any part of the income of the other 
group (take rate). Then, the latter group can respond by destroying own 
income. The results show: (1) group behavior is in line with individual 
behavior, but depends crucially on the decision rules that subject use to 
arrive at their group decision; (2) groups ignore the decision rule of their 
‘opponents’ and typically view other groups as if they were single agents; 
(3) perceptions of fairness are prone to the so-called self-serving bias; (4) 
expectations are often not consistent with actual outcomes.  
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1. Introduction 
In many economic situations, decisions are not taken by individuals but by groups, 
like committees, management teams or families. In economic theory, however, groups 
are often modeled as a single agent. Economists assume that groups do not behave 
differently than individuals. The object of this paper is to explore group decision-
making in a controlled laboratory experiment. In addition to comparing group and 
individual decisions, we particularly focus on the dynamics of the group decision-
making process. An important and new feature of this experiment is that groups are 
being videotaped while making their group decision.
1 The videotapes are used to 
make transcripts of the group discussions.
2 With the help of these transcripts, it is 
possible to learn more about individual motivations, such as fairness norms or urges 
to reciprocate, and the way these (sometimes conflicting) motivations interact in a 
group. Since gathering data on group behavior is expensive in general and, in our 
case, time consuming the number of observations is relatively small.
3 Nevertheless, 
the data are a rich source of information from which some interesting regularities 
about group behavior can be inferred.  
  Our experiment involves a simple two-player power-to-take game. This game 
was used by Bosman & van Winden (2002) – referred to as BvW, below – to study 
the influence of emotions on economic decision-making. Before this game is played, 
each player first has to earn an endowment Ei by doing an individual effort task. In the 
game one player can be considered as the ‘take authority’ (with endowment Etake) who 
is paired to another player, the ‘responder’ (with endowment Eresp). There are two 
stages. In the first stage, the randomly chosen take authority decides on the so-called 
take rate t∈ [0,1], which is the part of the responder’s endowment after the second 
stage that will be transferred to the take authority. In the second stage, the only action 
that the responder can take is to decide on d∈ [0,1], the part of Eresp that will be 
                                                 
1 According to Loomes (1999), the use of audio or video records makes up one of the real challenges of 
experimental economics in the future. For a more elaborate discussion on this research method, see 
Hennig-Schmidt (1999). Other experimental studies where video records are used, include Jacobsen & 
Sadrieh (1996) and Sadrieh & Hennig-Schmidt (1999).   
2 The reason why we videotaped group discussions, instead of audio tape, is that speakers can be 
identified more easily (Orbell et al., 1988). Moreover, non-verbal expressions, such as gestures and 
facial expressions, are also recorded and may facilitate identifying speakers and understanding their 
speech. 
3 We have 12 observations, which we believe is in line with many other studies on group-decision 
making. For example, in Bornstein & Yaniv (1998), who study ultimatum games, there are 12 
independent observations and in Goren & Bornstein (2000), focusing on prisoners’ dilemma games, 
there are 10 independent observations.    2
destroyed. For the take authority the payoff of the game is thus equal to the transfer 
t(1-d)Eresp, generating a total earnings out of the experiment equal to Etake + t(1-
d)Eresp. For the responder, the payoff equals (1-t)(1-d)Eresp, which also determines her 
or his total earnings. Note that in this game the responder can only destroy his or her 
own prior-to-the-take endowment (Eresp) and not that of the take authority (Etake). 
Furthermore, it follows that only if t=d=0 experimental earnings for both players will 
be equal to the endowment; otherwise, the responder will always get less than Eresp, 
whereas the take authority gets at least Etake.  
The power-to-take game is interesting from an economic point of view 
because it captures important aspects of taxation, principal-agent relationships, and 
monopoly pricing. In the area of taxation, for example, an owner of a production 
factor could diminish the supply of this factor if he or she feels that the tax on the 
returns to this factor is outrageous. BvW found that take authorities choose 
considerable take rates (the mean rate is almost 60%) and that responders typically 
destroy nothing or everything. In addition, expectations of the claim to be made by the 
take authority turn out to be important for the probability of destruction (responders 
who are optimistic, with hindsight, typically destroy).  
Although social psychologists have studied group dynamics quite extensively, 
there has not been much experimental work on group decision-making in economic 
settings.
4 Moreover, the evidence gathered by economists is inconclusive. For 
example, Bornstein & Yaniv (1998) find that groups who play an ultimatum game 
behave more in accordance with standard economic theory than individuals. Groups 
who are in the role of proposer demand more than individuals, while groups who are 
in the role of responder accept less than individuals. In the power-to-take game, which 
bears similarity to the ultimatum game, this should then show up in higher takes rates 
and lower destruction rates for groups. In an experimental study of the investment 
game (Berg et al., 1995), where a sender can send some amount x of his or her 
endowment to a receiver (which will then be tripled by the experimenter) and where 
the receiver can reciprocate by sending money back, Cox (2001) finds that only 
groups in the role of receiver behave more rationally than individuals (i.e. they send 
less money back than individuals do). However, other studies show that groups 
behave in a more other-regarding way (Cason & Mui, 1997, investigating the dictator   3
game), that they behave in the same way as individuals (Bone et al., 1999, focusing 
on lottery choice; see also Rockenbach et al., 2001; Prather & Middleton, 2002, 
examining the performance of mutual funds), or that they behave somewhat less 
rational than individuals (Cox & Hayne, 1998, studying common value auctions). 
There is also evidence that groups do not behave differently per se but learn faster and 
reason with more depth compared to individuals (Kocher & Sutter, 2000, studying 
beauty contests).  
Note that the above-mentioned studies compare decisions made by groups 
with decisions made by individuals. Our approach is new in the sense that we 
investigate the decision-making process as well, thereby focusing on how individual 
motivations interact in a group. To that purpose, discussions preceding decisions are 
videotaped and analyzed. With the help of this new method, we are able to explore 
interesting features of group decision-making that could not have been studied 
otherwise. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
discuss our research questions in more detail and present the experimental design. In 
section 3 the results are given. Section 4 follows with a summary and discussion.       
 
2. Research questions and experimental design 
2.1 Research questions 
Our first question is whether the decisions made by groups in the power-to-take game 
are different than those made by individuals. To that purpose, we compare our data on 
group behavior with the data on individual behavior of BvW. An import finding by 
social psychologists in this respect is the so-called ‘discontinuity effect’, which 
reflects the idea of group relations to be more competitive or less cooperative than 
those between individuals (Insko et al., 1988; Schopler et al., 1993). This hypothesis 
has originated from the research of Insko and Schopler et al. on 2-person prisoner's 
dilemma games, but support has been found for it in other games as well, such as 
ultimatum games (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Robert and Carnevale, 1997) and in 
negotiations (Polzer 1996). Applied to the power-to-take game, these findings suggest 
that take authority groups take more than individuals do, while responder groups 
destroy more easily than individuals.  
                                                                                                                                            
4 We will discuss some major findings by social psychologists in the next section when we present our 
research questions in more detail.   4
It is also possible that groups reason deeper and more carefully, and are therefore 
able to understand the strategic nature of the game more easily (Kerr et al, 1996; 
Sutter & Kocher, 2000). This would imply that group behavior is more in line with 
the standard economic model, that is, take authority groups take more than individuals 
would do and responder groups destroy less than individuals. 
Our second research question concerns the group decision-making process. In 
particular, we want to explore what kind of motivations are important in the power-to-
take game and how individuals, given their motivations, reach a group decision. In the 
experiment we did not impose any decision rule on subjects. They had 10 minutes for 
discussion and were asked to reach a decision in that period. An interesting question 
is what type of decision rule subjects employ. And, whether groups take the decision 
rule of their ‘opponent’ into account when making their group decision. For example, 
if take authority groups believe that responders will use the majority rule and that 
most of them do not want to destroy, then they would probably take more from a 
group than from an individual responder.  
There is evidence that people typically ignore the way in which groups reach their 
decision. For example, Messick et al. (1997) let individual proposers play an 
ultimatum game against responder groups, while manipulating the decision rule 
(which is known to the proposers) imposed on the responder group. They found that 
proposers ignore or overlook the importance of the group’s decision rule and therefore 
do not maximize their payoffs. The authors attribute this finding to subjects’ 
insensitivity to implications of the different decision rules and the difficulty they have 
with thinking accurately about the cognition of others. In light of this study, we would 
expect that subjects in our experiment do not take into account the way in which 
groups arrive at their group decision.  
The last research question deals with the role of expectations. As we pointed out in 
the introduction, BvW found that responders’ expectations play an important role in 
the decision to destroy their earned resources. Yet expectations should not play a role 
according to standard economic theory. Given the potential relevance of expectations, 
as suggested by the experimental findings, we will explore their role in the decision-
making process of both responder and take authority groups.   
   5
2.2 Experimental design 
The group experiment was run in the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at the 
University of Bonn. In total, 70 subjects, almost all undergraduate students from the 
University of Bonn, participated in the experiment. The show-up fee was 20 German 
marks (approximately 10 U.S. dollars), independent of subjects’ earnings in the 
experiment. In addition, subjects earned approximately 38 marks on average. The 
whole experiment took about 2 hours. We framed the take game as neutral as 
possible, avoiding any suggestive terms like take authority or responder (a translation 
of the instructions is provided in the Appendix).  
Before subjects played the power-to-take game, each subject first had to earn 
her or his endowment by doing the same individual effort task as in the experiment of 
BvW. This task is a computerized two-variable optimization problem that lasts for 30 
minutes.
5 It consists of 10 periods, where in each period subjects have to search for a 
maximum value. This maximum, which varies over the periods, can be imagined as 
the top of a mountain. The payoff for a period is related to the position on the 
mountain at the end of the period, with a maximum of 2 German marks. The task was 
set up such that most subjects were able to find the maximum value within the time 
limit of three minutes. Almost all subjects earned the maximum amount of 20 German 
marks. 
  After subjects had completed the computer task, they were randomly divided 
into two groups. One group was referred to as participants A (the take authorities) and 
the other as participants B (the responders). Then the instructions for the take game 
were read, followed by two individual exercises to check subjects’ understanding of 
the procedures. After these exercises, random responder and take authority groups 
were formed by letting take authorities draw a coded envelope from a box. Each 
group consisted of three members.
6 The envelope contained a form on which the 
income of a responder group from the real effort task were stated (see Appendix). The 
income of the group equaled the aggregate income of its members. The take 
authorities then had to leave the room and each group was brought to a separate room.  
  The responders were now asked to fill out a short questionnaire with questions 
concerning expectations and social back ground. Thereafter, each responder learned 
                                                 
5 For more details on this computer task, see van Dijk et al. (2001).     
6 There were 12 take authority and 12 responder groups. In one case, both the take authority and 
responder group consisted of two members.    6
about the take rate chosen by the take authority group they were matched to. After 
having filled out a second short questionnaire
7, responders were put in their group and 
each group was brought to a separate room.     
Each take authority group had 10 minutes to make a decision on the take rate, 
which was videotaped. After these 10 minutes, they had to fill in their own earnings 
as well as the take rate, and put the form back in the envelope again. Subsequently, 
the envelopes were brought to the matched responder groups who had 10 minutes 
time to decide on the part of their earnings to be destroyed, which was videotaped as 
well. The envelopes containing the forms were then returned to the take authority 
groups for their information. Before the take authority group received this envelope 
they had to fill out a short debriefing questionnaire, including a questionnaire about 
expectations. The responders were also asked to fill out a short debriefing 





A summary of group behavior is given in table 1. It appears that groups behave in 
much the same way as individuals. The take rates in the group experiment are similar 
to the take rates in the experiment of BvW (see the Appendix for a summary of their 
data). Two out of twelve groups destroyed their whole group income, while one 
destroyed 50%. These numbers are in line with individual responder behavior in the 
experiment of BvW.  
 
RESULT 1: Group behavior is in line with individual behavior. 
 
Support. Using a Mann-Whitney test, the hypothesis that the take rates in our 
experiment and the take rates from BvW are drawn from the same distribution cannot 
be rejected (p=0.77). Using a fisher exact test, the hypothesis that the proportions of 
responders who destroyed are the same in our experiment and the experiment of BvW 
cannot be rejected (p=0.71).  
                                                 
7 This questionnaire contained some questions about experienced emotions, as focused on in Bosman & 
Van Winden (2002).    7
 
Result 1 suggests that behavior in the power-to-take game is similar for groups and 
individuals. However, this result is not in line with the so-called discontinuity effect, 
discussed in the previous section. Groups do not appear to be more competitive than 
individuals. Furthermore, it is not in line with the idea that groups reason deeper and 
therefore behave more in accordance with the standard model than individuals. We 
now turn to the group decision-making process of the responders. 
 
Table 1. Summary of group behavior 
Case (#)  Take rate  (%)   Destruction rate (%) 
1 40  0 
2   45  0 
3 50  0 
4 50  0 
5 50  0 
6 60  100 
7 60  0 
8 60    0 
9 72  0 
10 73  0 
11 75  50 
12 85  100 




3.1 Group decision-making process of responders  
To investigate the relation between individual motivations and group behavior, we 
need a measure of an individual responder’s willingness to destroy based on the 
transcripts. To that purpose we define a new variable called the ‘individual 
destruction input’, which is either (1) the first destruction rate that is mentioned and 
can be identified as an intention or proposal, or (2) the first approval or confirmation 
of some destruction rate mentioned by another individual. It turns out that for one 
subject only it was not possible to determine her or his individual destruction input.
8 
The individual inputs are depicted in the last three columns of table 2. The other 
columns reproduce the data of table 1, for convenience.   
                                                 
8 To score the individual destruction inputs two raters went through the transcripts independently. In 4 
out of 35 cases, there was a discrepancy in scores. Subsequently, these four cases were again   8
 
Table 2. Individual destruction inputs   
Case (#)  t (%)   D (%)  Individual destruction input  (%) 
 
   responder 1    responder 2    responder 3 
1  40      0        0                     0                     0 
2   45      0        0                     0                     / 
3  50      0        0                     0                100 
4  50      0        0                     0                100 
5  50      0        0                     0                  >0 
6  60     100    100                 100                100 
7  60      0        0                     0                    0 
8  60       0        0                     0                    0 
9  72      0      40                     0                    ? 
10  73      0        0                     0                    0 
11  75       50        0                 100                    0  
12  85     100    100                 100                100 
Note: t denotes the take rate and d the part of the group income that is destroyed. 
The last three columns give the individual destruction input of each individual 
responder i=1, 2, 3.; case 2 consists of two individual responders; case 9 has one 
missing observation. Cases are ordered by the take rate. 
 
The next result deals with the individual input of responders. 
 
RESULT 2: Individual responders typically want to destroy either 0 or 100% of the 
earned group income. Furthermore, the individual inputs are in line with individual 
behavior in the experiment of BvW.    
 
Support. In total, 32 out of the 35 subjects showed a preference for a destruction rate 
of either 0 or 100%, while 2 wanted to destroy an intermediate amount, and one 
member did not reveal a preference. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the 
individual inputs are drawn from the same distribution as the individual destruction 
rates in the experiment of BvW (Mann-Whitney test, two-sided, p=0.30). 
 
Note that result 2 is in line with the BvW experiment where individuals either destroy 
everything or nothing. For example, the transcripts show that in one group an 
individual said: “OK, I believe there are only two extremes since the rest is foolish”, 
while in another group a member said: “So, in my view the question can only be, do 
                                                                                                                                            
considered by two other raters, followed by a final discussion with all raters. Ultimately, the 
discrepancies were solved and supported by all raters.      9
we destroy everything or do we destroy nothing (...) in between is playing”. In the 
responder group where 50% of the group income was destroyed, the group outcome 
was clearly a compromise, since individual members indicated to prefer a destruction 
rate of either 0 % or 100%.  
  Responders’ individual expectations of the take rate appear to play a 
qualitatively similar role in our experiment as in the experiment of BvW. Recall that 
the individual responder’s expectation of the take rate was assessed before group 
members came together to decide on destruction and before they learned about the 
take rate. It turns out that responders who are too optimistic typically provide an input 
for destruction in the group discussion. 
 
RESULT 3: Responders who were optimistic typically provide an input for 
destruction in the group discussion. 
 
Support. It turns out that 15 out of 29 responders who reported an expectation and 
revealed their input were optimistic (that is, for them the actual take rate was higher 
than expected) and 8 out of these 15 optimists provided an input for destruction, while 
of the 14 pessimists/realists only 3 provided an input for destruction. Using a Fisher 
exact test, the hypothesis that the proportion of optimistic responders who provided an 
input for destruction is the same as the proportion of pessimistic/realistic responders 
who provided an input for destruction is rejected at the 10% level (p=0.082, one-
sided). A binary logit model, with the individual input as dependent variable (equal to 
1 if the individual input is greater than zero; 0 otherwise) and as explanatory variable 
the expected take rate, gives further support that expectations are important for the 
individual destruction input (the estimated model, with a coefficient of –0.037, is 
significant at the 5% level, n=29). The logit model that also includes the take rate is 
marginally significantly better (likelihood ratio test, p=0.07; coefficient for the take 
rate is 0.07 and for the expected take rate -0.04).          
 
RESULT 4: The individual responder’s expectation of the take rate is on average 
consistent with the actual take rate chosen by the take authority group. However, 
there is a lot of variation around the mean. Furthermore, it seems that individual 
responders in the group experiment expect lower take rates than responders in the 
individual experiment of BvW.   10
 
Support.  The average expected take rate is 51.3% (st. dev.=28.7). There is no 
correlation between the expected take rate and the actual take rate (Spearman 
correlation coefficient=-0.16, p=0.39). Using a Mann-Whitney test, the hypothesis 
that the expected take rates and actual take rates are drawn from the same distribution 
is not rejected (p=0.44, two sided). Out of 30 responders who reported an expectation, 
3 had beliefs confirmed, 11 were too pessimistic, and 16 were too optimistic. Finally, 
the hypothesis that the expected take rates in the group experiment and the expected 
take rates in experiment of BvW are drawn from the same distribution is rejected at 
the 10% level (p=0.0564, two-tailed). 
 
Although responders on average had beliefs consistent with actual behavior, the 
majority of responders did not predict the take rate very well, as there is a lot of 
variation around the mean. The average expected take rate in the group experiment is 
51% and in the individual experiment 66%. Since the actual mean take rate in our 
experiment and the experiment of BvW is 60%, responders in our experiment are (on 
average) too optimistic. In the discussion of section 4 we will come back to this result.   
Another interesting observation is that responders typically stuck to their 
intended decisions in the group discussion, even in case of conflicting preferences. 
Those who wanted to destroy neither seemed to cool off nor got persuaded by more 
‘rational’, i.e. self-interested, members during the 10 minutes discussion. In most 
cases where there was no agreement, the group decision is consistent with a simple 
majority decision rule (note that no formal decision rule was imposed).  
 
OBSERVATION 1: If there is a conflict in terms of destruction inputs, then most 
group decisions are consistent with a simple majority decision rule. 
 
Support. In seven groups all individual responders had the same destruction input, 
which also turned out to be the group destruction rate. In four groups there was a 
conflict in terms of destruction inputs: two out of three responders in each group 
showed a preference for no destruction, while the others preferred to destroy either 
something or everything. In three out of those four groups, the destruction rate was 
equal to the destruction rate preferred by the majority, while in one group a 
compromise was made at 50%. Note that in all these four groups responders explicitly   11
discussed the group decision rule. In those three groups where the group decision is 
consistent with majority rule, there was also an explicit reference to majority rule in 
the group discussion. Finally, note that in one group we cannot conclude whether the 
group decision is consistent with majority rule because the individual destruction 
input of one responder could not be determined.  
 
Interestingly, observation 1 suggests that the composition of the group, in terms of 
individuals’ inputs, determines whether group behavior is more or less ‘rational’ than 
that of its members. In the next section we will come back to this issue. 
Next we investigate whether responders are concerned with fairness, in 
particular with respect to the take rate. To that purpose we need some measure of a 
responder’s notion of fairness based on the group discussion. We define a fair take 
rate in a similar way as was done for the individual destruction input, namely (1) the 
first take rate that is explicitly referred to as being fair or (2) the first approval or 
confirmation of the perception of fairness revealed by another responder.
9 Although it 
turns out that only a small subset of the responders explicitly refers to fairness, all of 
them perceive a take rate of 0% as being fair.  
 
RESULT 5: The majority of responders do not discuss fairness when making the 
group decision. When fairness is discussed, they all perceive a take rate of 0% as fair. 
 
Support. 5 out of 35 responders referred to fairness during the group discussion. All of 
them share the opinion that a take rate of 0% is fair.
10  
 
For example, in one responder group it is discussed that “ Group A gets 40 marks for 
sure (…) so it would have been fair, when they had taken 0%”.  
                                                 
9 With regard to scoring fairness, in 2 out 35 cases there was discrepancy among the raters. After a 
short discussion, all discrepancies could be solved.  
10 In addition to the word ‘fair’, some responders used expressions that could be related to fairness. For 
example, one responder refers to destruction as ‘a moral case’ because the take authorities have taken 
something that the responders have earned themselves. Furthermore, this responder points out that the 
take authorities and the responders have done the same amount of effort to obtain their endowment. 
Because raters did not always agree whether expressions such as these refer to fairness, we have 
reported results for the explicit use of the word ‘fair’ only.      12
The last result on responder behavior deals with the way in which the 
responders view the take authorities. More specifically, do responders in their 
decision take the group decision-making process of take authorities into account? 
 
RESULT 6: Responders perceive the take authority group as a single agent and 
typically ignore intra-group processes.     
 
Support. In the group discussion of responders there was never any reference to the 
group decision-making process of take authorities. When they refer to the take 
authority group, they refer to it as if it were a single agent. 
 
Result 6 is in line with the aforementioned study of Messick et al. (1997), showing 
that individuals typically ignore the decision rule of an opponent group.   
 
 
3.2. Group decision-making process of take authorities  
In the analysis of take authorities, we again look at the relation between individual 
motivations and group behavior. To that end we define a new variable called the 
‘individual take input’, which can be seen as a measure of an individual take 
authority’s willingness to claim income of the responder group. It is defined as either 
(1) the first take rate that is mentioned and can be identified as an intention or 
proposal, or (2) approval or confirmation of some take rate mentioned by another 
individual. It turns out that for one subject only it was not possible to determine her or 
his individual take input.
11 The individual inputs are depicted in the last three columns 
of table 3, where the remaining columns are reproduced from table 1, for 
convenience.  
 
First we investigate whether the individual take inputs differ from the take rates 
selected by individual players in the experiment of BvW. It turns out that this is not 
the case. 
 
RESULT 7: The individual take inputs are similar to the take rates selected by 
individual players in the experiment of BvW.   13
 
Support. Using a Mann-Whitney test, the hypothesis that the individual take inputs are 
the same as the take rates selected by individual players in the BvW experiment 
cannot be rejected (p=0.66, two-tailed; a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also shows no 
significance, p=0.53). The average take input is 62.4% (st. dev.=23.7) while in the 
BvW experiment it is 58.5% (st. dev.=24.3).    
 
Table 3. Individual take inputs   
Case (#)  t (%)   D (%)  Individual take input  (%) 
 
   take authority 1      take authority 2      take authority 3 
1  40      0           30                           20                           20 
2   45      0         100                           50                            / 
3  50      0           50                           60                           75 
4  50      0           49                           60                           45 
5  50      0           50                         100                             0 
6  60     100           50                           50                           55 
7  60      0           75                           60                           60 
8  60       0         100                           50                           70 
9  72      0           70                           70                           75 
10  73      0           73                           50                           75   
11  75       50           90                           75                           90  
12  85     100         100                           75                            ? 
Note: t denotes the take rate and d the part of the group income that is destroyed. The last three 
columns give the individual take input of each individual take authority i=1, 2, 3.; case 2 consists 




We now turn to the expectations of individual take authorities with regard to 
destruction. First we assess whether the individual take authority’s expectation of the 
destruction rate in the group experiment is in line with individual expectations in the 
BvW experiment. Although expectations in the group experiment were assessed 
somewhat differently than in the BvW experiment, the reported expected destruction 
rates appear to be similar.
12 Furthermore, as with the responders, it appears that the 
                                                                                                                                            
11 The individual take inputs were scored in the same way as was done for the individual destruction 
inputs of the responders (see 3.1).  
12 A direct comparison of the expectations of take authorities in the BvW and group experiment is 
somewhat complicated by the fact that in the first experiment subjects were asked to assign a 
probability to an interval of possible destruction rates (quartiles), whereas in the latter experiment they 
had to select a single rate. As it turned out, in the BvW experiment the mean probability of destruction 
reported by the take authorities was 67.5% for the interval [0%, 25%] (and 9%, 6%, and 10% for the 
next three intervals, respectively). In the group experiment the mean of the expected destruction rate   14
expectations of the take authorities in the group experiment are not consistent with 
reality, that is, they deviate from the destruction rates that were actually chosen by the 
responder groups.     
 
RESULT 8: Expectations of the take authorities regarding the behavior of the 
responder groups are not consistent with actual responder behavior.  
 
Support. The average expected rate of destruction is 9.7% (st. dev.=15.8), whereas 
responder groups destroyed on average 21% of their income. Note that 19 subjects 
expected a destruction rate of 0%, while 14 subjects expected a destruction rate 
between 5 and 70%. Furthermore, it turns out that there is no correlation between the 
expected destruction rate and the actual destruction rate (Spearman correlation 
coefficient=-0.09, p=0.63). This shows that take authorities did not have realistic 
expectations, that is, expectations that are consistent with actual responder behavior. 
Out of the 33 take authorities who reported an expectation, 14 had beliefs consistent 
with reality, 11 were too pessimistic, and 8 were too optimistic.  
 
We now turn to the question of how take authorities arrive at their group decision. It 
appears that group behavior is consistent with two types of decision rules. 
   
OBSERVATION 2: The group decision of take authorities could be consistent with 
both majority rule (median voter behavior) and a group compromise (approximated 
by the average individual take input).    
 
Support.  If we consider the groups with a median voter, assuming single-peaked 
preferences, it turns out that in 4 out of 10 cases the take input of the median voter lies 
closer to the group decision than the average take input. In 5 out of these 10 cases, the 
average take input lies closer to the group decision than the input of the median voter. 
In one case the group decision, take input of the median voter, and the average take 
input coincide. However, if we look at the correlation between, on the one hand, the 
group decision and, on the other hand, the take input of the median voter or the 
                                                                                                                                            
was 9.7%. If we distribute the expectations in the group experiment over the categories as used in the 
BvW experiment, the mean rate is 88% for the interval [0, 25] (and 9%, 3%, and 0% for the next three   15
average take input, in turns out that both correlations are significant (coefficient for 
correlation is 0.90 and 0.86, respectively; both p<0.01). This correlation suggests that 
either decision rule could generate the observed outcomes, and we cannot say for sure 
which one is predominant. Note that the average take input is 55.1% and the median 




Next we investigate whether take authorities are concerned with fairness. We define a 
fair take rate in a similar way as was done for the responders, namely (1) the first take 
rate that is referred to as being fair or (2) the first approval or confirmation of the 
perception of fairness revealed by another take authority.
14 Although only a small 
subset of the take authorities explicitly refers to fairness, a majority of them perceive 
a take rate greater than 0% as being fair.  
 
RESULT 9: Most take authorities do not discuss fairness when making the group 
decision. When fairness is discussed, it is typically at a later stage of the group 
discussion. Almost all take authorities who discuss fairness perceive a take rate 
greater than 0% as fair. 
 
Support. Out of the 35 take authorities 9 referred to fairness during the group 
discussion, with 8 (1) of them believing that a take rate greater than (equal to) 0% is 
fair (7 believed that a rate of 50% is fair).
15 Furthermore, in only 1 out of 12 groups 
fairness was discussed in an early stage of the group discussion.  
  
                                                                                                                                            
intervals, respectively). We conclude that the reported information in both experiments appears to be 
similar.  
13 Interestingly, if we look at the correlation between the group decision and the lowest (or highest) 
take input of the group, it turns out that only the lowest take input is significant (coefficient=0.80, 
p<0.01; p-value of the high take input is 0.41; note that in 4 cases the median take input is equal to the 
lowest take input). In other words, greedy individual take authorities, who behave more in accordance 
with the standard model, are generally not able to dominate the group decision. This finding is in 
contrast with Robert & Carnevale (1997) who observed in the context of ultimatum bargaining that the 
preference of the most competitive group member predicts the group outcome best.      
14 With regard to scoring fairness, again in 2 out 35 cases there was a discrepancy among the raters. 
After a short discussion, these discrepancies could be solved. 
15 In addition to the word ‘fair’, other expressions were used that could be related to fairness. These 
expressions include: ‘a take rate of 50% is honest’, ‘ a take rate of 60% is also social’, and ‘taking 
everything is terribly mean’. As was the case for the responders, raters did not always agree whether 
expressions such as these refer to fairness. Therefore, we have reported results for the explicit use of 
the word ‘fair’ only.     16
Interestingly, there is a large discrepancy between what responders generally consider 
to be fair (a take rate of 0%) and what take authorities perceive to be fair. For 
example, one take authority points out that “ we only play with regard to their earned 
money” and another take authority “50% after all is a fair deal”. When it comes to 
fairness, it seems that individuals are prone to the so-called self-serving bias. We 
come back to this result in more detail in the next section. The last result deals with 
the way in which the take authorities view the responders. More specifically, do take 
authorities in their decision take the group decision-making process of responders into 
account? 
 
RESULT 10: The take authorities perceive the responder group as a single agent and 
typically ignore intra-group processes.     
 
Support. In the group discussion of take authorities there was never any reference to 
the group decision-making process of the responders. When they refer to the 
responder group, they refer to it as if it were a single agent. 
 
Surprisingly, both the take authorities and responders ignore the group decision 
making process of their opponents. In the next section, we come back to this results 
and shall discuss the implications of this ‘single agent perspective’ in more detail. 
 
 
4. Summary and discussion 
The goal of this paper is to study group-decision making in a power-to-take 
experiment. A new feature of our study is that discussions preceding group decisions 
are videotaped and analyzed. We explore in which way individual motivations, such 
as norms of fairness and urges to retaliate, interact in a group. In addition, we 
investigate the role of expectations. Our results show that group behavior is in line 
with behavior observed in the individual power-to-take experiment. Take authority 
groups choose considerable take rates and responder groups destroy a substantial part 
of their earned income when the take rate is high. At the individual level, most 
responders want to destroy 0 or 100% of their group income. Furthermore, it appears 
that if there is a conflict in terms of input, responder groups typically use majority rule   17
to arrive at their group decision. The decision of take authority groups, on the other 
hand, is consistent with both majority rule and with a group compromise, 
approximated by the average individual input. Expectations of responders and take 
authorities concerning the behavior of their ‘opponents’ are usually not consistent 
with actual behavior. Although only a small fraction of the subjects discusses fairness 
explicitly, responders clearly have a different view than take authorities on what is 
fair in the power-to-take game. Finally, it appears that both the take authority and 
responder groups ignore the way in which their ‘opponent’ reaches a decision. Groups 
typically view other groups as if they were single agents.  
  In the now growing literature on group decision-making in economics, the key 
question is whether groups behave differently than individuals. To answer this 
question, virtually all studies compare group decisions with individual decisions. At 
first sight, our results support the view that group behavior is in line with individual 
behavior. However, our results also show that when groups are compared to 
individuals the decision rule and the composition of the group in terms of individual 
inputs play a crucial role. Recall that we did not impose any decision rule on groups 
to reach their decision. Yet all groups were able to arrive at a group decision by 
employing either a simple majority rule or by making a compromise in the direction 
of the average individual input. To illustrate the importance of the decision rule, table 
4 shows some outcomes of different decision rules for responders, given the observed 
individual inputs. As can be seen from this table, the percentage of groups that destroy 
can range from 18%, in case of a simple majority rule, to 58%, which would result if a 
compromise is made. Furthermore, note that also the composition of the group, in 
terms of individual inputs, is important for the outcome. Our data (see table 2) shows 
that the inputs of responders were not distributed randomly over the groups since 
there were two groups where every responder provided a destruction input of 100%. 
Suppose the inputs were distributed more randomly, with for example only one 
responder providing an input for destruction in each group. In that case, the decision 
rule turns out to be even more important because the percentage of responder groups 
that destroy could range from 0% (majority rule) to 92% (compromise).
16  
                                                 
16 If the eleven responders who provided a positve input for destruction were allocated to different 
groups, then zero groups would destroy (part of ) their income under a majority rule and eleven groups 
under a compromise rule (that is, 92% of the responder groups would destroy part of their group 
income).   18
Given the importance of a decision rule in group decision-making, as 
suggested above, it is surprising that groups do not discuss at all the way in which 
other groups reach a decision. Groups clearly have a tendency to perceive other 
groups as if they were single agents (see also Messick, et al., 1997). It would be 
interesting to establish whether this phenomenon also shows up in different 
environments (e.g. other experimental games), whether it occurs when subjects are 
given explicit information about the decision rule, and whether subjects can learn to 
take the decision rule of their ‘opponents’ into account (e.g. via repetition of the 
game). 
 
Table 4. Group destruction under different decision rules for responders 
Decision rule  Percentage of groups that destroy 
Actual behavior  0.25 
Majority rule  0.18 
Minority rule  0.45 
Compromise* 0.58 
Note: * the average input of all responders equals the group decision. 
 
We conjectured that fairness norms would play an important role in the group 
discussions. Although only a small fraction of the subjects discusses fairness 
explicitly, responders clearly have a different view than take authorities on what is 
fair in the power-to-take game. Responders typically view a take rate of 0% as fair, 
whereas the majority of take authorities who discuss fairness believe that a take rate 
of 50% is fair. Interestingly, perceptions of fairness are prone to the so-called self-
serving bias, which occurs “when individuals subconsciously alter their fundamental 
views about what is fair or right in a way that benefits their interests” (Dahl & 
Ransom, 1999, p.703). Although the self-serving bias has been well established for 
individuals, it now appears that this phenomenon also shows up in group settings (see 
also Hennig-Schmidt, 2002). Apparently, individual biases concerning perceptions of 
fairness are not corrected by group discussions.  
We find it somewhat surprising that only a small fraction of the subjects 
discusses fairness explicitly, given the emphasis put on fairness in the recent 
experimental literature (e.g. Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Does this mean that only a small 
fraction of the subjects is concerned with fairness? For the take authorities this seems   19
plausible since most of them are concerned with maximizing own payoffs. For the 
responders, it is possible that fairness norms play an important role. If we assume that 
the revealed norms are shared between all responders, then most of them are treated 
unfairly. Perhaps these fairness norms play a role at a more subconscious level. But it 
is also possible that in this environment other motivations, in particular emotional 
urges, play an important role as well. For the responders, in an individual power-to-
take experiment, BvW found evidence that negative emotions such as irritation and 
contempt are important for the decision to destroy. An important feature of emotional 
urges is that they "clamor for attention and for execution" (Frijda, 1986, p.78). 
Therefore emotions could easily overrule other considerations in the decision-making 
process, such as expressing one's views on fairness.    
  Finally, we briefly turn to the role of expectations, in particular those of the 
responders. Qualitatively, it appears that expectations play a similar role in our group 
experiment as in the experiment with individual decision-making. Expectations are 
important for the individual input for destruction, and thereby, for the group decision. 
In particular, responders who turn out to have been optimistic -- that is, when the take 
rate they are facing is higher than their expected take rate -- show an appetite for 
destruction. Surprisingly, though, responders in the individual experiment were on 
average too pessimistic (expecting a higher take rate than they actually got), whereas 
in this experiment responders were on average too optimistic. Why would that be? 
One reason for this difference could be that responders expect groups to behave in a 
more other-regarding way. On the other hand, our finding that responders typically 
perceive the take authority group as a single agent, would seem to run against this 
argument. Another reason may be that responders assume that groups destroy more 
easily than individuals and that take authorities take this into account when choosing a 
take rate. Obviously, this type of reasoning is more sophisticated because it includes 
the motivations of other responders in the group as well as those of the take 
authorities. Because expectations were assessed before responders came together to 
make the group decision, there was not any discussion on this issue among the 
responders. Moreover, with regard to the take authorities, we found that they also 
seem to consider the (opponent) responder group as if it were a single agent. Clearly 
more research is necessary to understand how expectations are formed in group 
settings. This can be done, for example, by letting responders collectively form (and 
discuss) their beliefs about the behavior of the take authority group.      20
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Ytake Y resp t 
(%) 
d (%)   Case 
(#) 
Ytake Yresp t (%)  d (%) 
1  15 15  0  0    21  15 15  70  0 
2  15 15  0  0    22  15 15  70  0 
3  15 12  0  0    23  15 15  70  0 
4  15 13.5 25  0    24  15 13.5 70  30 
5  15 15 30  0    25  15 15  70  0 
6  15 15 30  0    26  15 15  70  0 
7  15 15 30  0    27  15 15  70  0 
8  15 15 35  0    28  15 15  70  100 
9  15 15 40  0    29  15 15  70  100 
10  15 15 50  0    30  15 15  70  0 
11  15 15 50  0    31  15 15  70  0 
12  15 15 50  0    32  15 15  75  100 
13  15 15 50  0    33  15 15  75  0 
14 15  13.5 60 0    34 15  15  80  0 
15 15  15  65 0    35 15  9 80  99 
16 15  15  65 0    36 15  13.5 80 100 
17  15 15 65  0    37  15 15  90  100 
18  15 15 65  0    38  15 15  90  0 
19  15 15 66  0    39  15 15 100  100 
20 15  15  66.7  0             
Note: Reproduced from Bosman & van Winden (2002). Ytake denotes the effort-task income of the take 
authority, Yresp the effort task income of the responder (both incomes in guilders), t the take rate and d 




Summary of the instructions of the power-to-take game  
(translated from German; full instructions are available on request) 
  
Show-up fee 
This is 20 DM for all participants in the experiment. You keep the show-up fee, independent 
of the decisions taken in the experiment. The show-up fee is included in the calculation of 
your individual earnings at the end of the experiment.  
 
Division in groups 
The 6 participants A and B will in the course of the experiment be divided into two groups,  A 
and B, such that in each group 3 persons decide together. The group decisions take place in 
different rooms and will be video taped. The allocation of individuals to groups will be 
described below.  
 
Two phases 
The experiment consists of two phases. In phase 1 only group A must make a decision 
whereas in phase 2 only group B must make a decision. Every participant, be it in group A or 
B, must make one decision. There are no other decisions that will follow.   23
 
Phase 1: group A chooses percentage 
In this phase, each group A will be paired with a group B. This will be done by letting each 
participant A draw a coded envelope. With the help of the different codes, the 6 participants A 
and B will be divided into two groups, with three participants in each group. Every group A 
will be paired to a group B. Because of this procedure, both group A and B remain 
anonymous.      
 
In the envelope, there is a form with a black box, which must be filled in by group A, and a 
grey box which must be filled in by group B (see specimen). In the black box of group A, we 
have filled in the total earnings of group B from the previous part of the experiment. Group A 
must fill in its own total earnings. Group A must then choose a percentage and fill this in on 
the form. This percentage determines how much of group B’s total earnings after phase 2 will 
be transferred to group A. The percentage chosen by participant A must be an integer in the 
interval [0, 100]. 
  The decision must be taken unanimously and then filled in on the form. All group 
members must agree by signing a separate form.  
 
When the participants of group A have completed the form, it must be put in the envelope 
again. After this we will collect the envelopes and bring them to group B paired with group A 
by means of the code. 
 
Phase 2: group B chooses percentage 
In this phase group B has to fill in on the form which percentage of its total earnings will be 
destroyed. The percentage chosen by group B must be an integer in the interval [0, 100]. The 
decision must be taken unanimously and then filled in on the form. All group members must 
agree by signing a separate form. The transfer from group B to group A will be based on the 
rest earnings of group B that are left after destruction. Group B must transfer the percentage 
of their rest earnings chosen by group A. 
 
When group B has completed the form, it must be put in the envelope again. After this we 
will collect the envelopes and bring them to group A, that is paired to group B, for their 
information.  
 
Determination of individual earnings in part 2 
Every member of group A always receives one third of its group earnings. For members of 
group B earnings are determined as follows. If all members of group B have the same 
earnings from part 1 of the experiment, then group earnings will be divided by 3. Every 
member gets one third of the group earnings. If the members of group B do not have the same 
earnings from part 1 of the experiment, then the group earnings from part 2 are divided 
proportionally. For example: two members have earned 20 DM and one member 10 DM in 
part 1. Assume that that the groep earnings from part 2 are equal to 25DM. This means that 
two members receive 10 DM and one member 5DM.  
   24
          
 Code:  …….   













            
 
GroupA fills in this block: 
 
 
Earnings group A: ......  DM. 
 
Earnings group B: ......  DM. 
 
We (Group A) decide that  ………. % of the earnings of group B will be transferred to us. 
Group B fills in this block: 
 
 
We (Group B) destroy ………. % of our earnings.  
  